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ABSTRACT 
  This Note considers how the Supreme Court’s decision in Utility 
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG) may have created a new 
opening for federal common law nuisance litigation as a means to 
address climate change. The Court’s earlier decision in American 
Electric Power v. Connecticut (AEP) held that federal nuisance claims 
targeting greenhouse gas emissions were completely displaced by the 
Clean Air Act. However, the holding in AEP was premised on the 
assumption that the Clean Air Act uniformly addressed greenhouse 
gases throughout the statute. UARG upended this assumption, holding 
that there are sections of the Clean Air Act that do not encompass 
greenhouse gases. Therefore, there may be sources of greenhouse gas 
emissions that are not regulated by the statute. Based on the 
displacement analysis employed in AEP, this would mean that the 
federal common law of nuisance would not be displaced as to these 
sources.  
  The Clean Air Act’s coverage of the greenhouse gas emissions from 
one important category of sources—existing stationary sources—is an 
open question. Until recently, the D.C. Circuit appeared poised to 
answer at least part of this question in West Virginia v. EPA, the case 
challenging the Obama administration’s signature carbon dioxide 
regulation—the Clean Power Plan. The Clean Power Plan was 
premised on Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, and the D.C. Circuit’s 
en banc decision would have resolved whether and to what extent 
Section 111(d) can be used to regulate certain existing sources’ 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, the Trump administration has 
proposed to rescind the regulation, and it appears increasingly unlikely 
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that the D.C. Circuit will issue a decision on the merits of the litigation. 
Therefore, it remains unclear whether Section 111(d) addresses existing 
sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. As this Note shows, the only other 
section of the Clean Air Act that might encompass these sources’ 
greenhouse gas emissions is Section 115, but this is far from certain.  
  This Note argues that a federal common law nuisance suit should be 
leveraged in the face of this uncertainty. The result would be salutary, 
win or lose. On the one hand, the suit could result in a holding that 
either Section 111(d) or Section 115 encompasses greenhouse gases, 
which would mean that the federal common law would indeed be 
displaced. This holding could then be used to force the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate existing sources’ greenhouse gas 
emissions under those sections. On the other hand, if the court finds 
that the Clean Air Act does not address existing sources’ greenhouse 
gas emissions, then these sources would be subject to substantial 
litigation risk. This exposure, in turn, could induce these sources to ask 
Congress to draft legislation that addresses their greenhouse gas 
emissions, thereby displacing any future common law claims. In the 
end, the desired outcome of the federal nuisance suit is the same: to 
catalyze comprehensive regulatory or legislative coverage of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, which is imperative to 
avert the most devastating effects of climate change.  
INTRODUCTION 
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP),1 eight 
states, New York City, and three nonprofit land trusts sued the five 
largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States—electric power 
plants which, at the time of the suit, emitted 2.5 percent of humanity’s 
total annual carbon pollution.2 The plaintiffs alleged, among other 
things, that the defendants’ contribution to global warming constituted 
a public nuisance under federal common law.3 The Second Circuit 
agreed with the plaintiffs,4 but the Supreme Court reversed. Finding 
that the Clean Air Act Section 111(d)5 provides “a means to seek limits 
 
 1. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410 (2011).  
 2. Id. at 418.  
 3. Id. A public nuisance is a “substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights.” 
Id. Despite the familiar holding in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the federal 
common law—as distinct from the general common law—continues to exist, primarily around 
interstate issues where no single state’s law would apply. See infra Part I.A.  
 4. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 5. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 111(d), 77 Stat. 392, 84 Stat. 1684 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 7411(d)). For a discussion of this provision of the Clean Air Act, see infra Part I.B.  
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on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic powerplants,” the Court 
held that the Clean Air Act displaced the plaintiffs’ “parallel” federal 
common law claim.6  
Industry groups and their counsel embraced the decision, 
declaring that “[t]he federal common law of public nuisance [has] died 
after a long illness” and that the doctrine is an “extinct tort.”7 
Commentators and scholars broadly agreed, concluding that “the 
decision in AEP has completely foreclosed any avenue to enjoin any 
type of air pollution under the federal common law of nuisance.”8 
Climate change plaintiffs too have abandoned the tort.9 Nevertheless, 
this Note contends that this use of the federal common law has been 
laid to rest prematurely.10 Industry’s success at limiting the Clean Air 
Act’s coverage of greenhouse gases has already injected glimmers of 
life into the doctrine, and the doctrine stands to come surging back if 
ongoing efforts to limit the Clean Air Act’s coverage of greenhouse 
gases are successful.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in one industry victory—
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG)11—may have laid the 
grounds for the doctrine’s resurrection. In UARG, a clandestine 
 
 6. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425. The plaintiffs in AEP were only seeking injunctive relief, but the 
Ninth Circuit subsequently clarified that the Clean Air Act also displaces federal nuisance claims 
for damages. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013). 
 7. The Death of Environmental Common Law?, MCGUIREWOODS (Oct. 3, 2012), 
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2012/10/Death-Environmental-
Common-Law.aspx [https://perma.cc/RTU6-Y734]; see also Keith Goldberg, No Future for 
Climate Change Torts, Attys Say, LAW360 (May 23, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/444225/no-future-for-climate-change-torts-attys-say [https://perma.cc/5FD3-UE4S] 
(noting that “AEP laid down the gauntlet—the [Clean Air Act] is one-stop shopping for questions 
under climate change” (emphasis added)).  
 8. Damian M. Brychcy, Note, American Electric Power v. Connecticut: Disaster Averted by 
Displacing the Federal Common Law of Nuisance, 46 GA. L. REV. 459, 486 (2012); see also R. 
Trent Taylor, The Obsolescence of Environmental Common Law, 40 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 1, 
1 (2013) (finding that federal climate change litigation is “on the verge of obsolescence”); David 
R. Brody, Case Comment, American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 297, 302 (2012) (declaring that environmental claims under federal common law are 
“[m]ostly [d]ead”).  
 9. See Juscelino F. Colares & Kosta Ristovski, Pleading Patterns and the Role of Litigation 
as a Driver of Federal Climate Change Legislation, 54 JURIMETRICS 329, 333 (2014) (noting that 
there have been only four federal nuisance claims around climate change and only one since 
AEP). 
 10. As Mark Twain once quipped after discovering that a newspaper had prematurely 
published his obituary, “[t]he reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.” PETER 
MESSENT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO MARK TWAIN 22 (2007).  
 11. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).  
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collective of electric utilities and trade groups12 challenged efforts of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require certain 
stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain permits and install 
pollution control technology under the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) and Title V requirements of the Clean Air Act.13 
UARG held that, even though the Clean Air Act has one act-wide 
definition of “air pollutant,” the statute does not uniformly treat 
greenhouse gases as air pollutants throughout each of its sections.14 
Thus, the Court found that the EPA “may not treat greenhouse gases 
as a pollutant” for the purpose of determining whether a source may 
be subject to PSD and Title V requirements.15  
UARG’s holding undermined a basic assumption of AEP—that 
the Clean Air Act comprehensively addressed greenhouse gases16—
and has therefore created a potential opening for federal nuisance 
claims. Ultimately, however, a federal nuisance suit would be viable 
only if no section of the Clean Air Act is found to provide a basis to 
regulate the defendant’s greenhouse gas emissions, and many of the 
Clean Air Act’s sections have not yet been tested in the courts.17 Until 
recently, the D.C. Circuit appeared poised to resolve at least part of 
this question in West Virginia v. EPA,18 the case challenging the EPA’s 
landmark carbon dioxide regulation—the Clean Power Plan.19 The 
Clean Power Plan was premised on Section 111(d) of the Clean Air 
Act, and the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision would have resolved 
whether and to what extent that section can be used to regulate 
greenhouse gases from existing sources. However, the Trump 
 
 12. See John Walke, Is Your Power Company Fighting in Court Against Safeguards from 
Mercury and Toxic Air Pollution?, NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (May 25, 2012), https://www.nrdc.org/
experts/john-walke/your-power-company-fighting-court-against-safeguards-mercury-and-toxic-
air [https://perma.cc/ZQ5M-2TKY] (noting that UARG has no online presence but that it 
appears to be linked with a Washington, D.C. law firm and has “no obvious independence” from 
the firm). Walke wondered “whether one reason for UARG’s creation was to shield the names 
of member companies from general public awareness when UARG advocates for dirtier results 
on the companies’ behalf.” Id.  
 13. For a primer on these provisions of the Clean Air Act, see infra Part I.B.  
 14. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2449.  
 15. Id.  
 16. For a discussion of this assumption, see infra Part III.A.  
 17. For a discussion of each section of the Clean Air Act that might be used to regulate 
greenhouse gases, see infra Part III.B.  
 18. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. argued Sept. 27, 2016). 
 19. See id.; see also Clean Power Plan Case Resources, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.
org/climate/clean-power-plan-case-resources [http://perma.cc/MFV3-32MR] (documenting the 
ongoing litigation in West Virginia v. EPA).  
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administration has issued a proposal to repeal the regulation,20 and it 
appears increasingly unlikely that the court will issue a decision on the 
merits.21 Therefore, it remains unclear whether or to what extent 
Section 111(d) addresses existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. 
As this Note demonstrates, the only other section that might credibly 
be used to regulate existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions is 
Section 115, but it has never been tested in the courts.  
A federal nuisance suit should be leveraged in the face of this 
uncertainty. On the one hand, a federal nuisance suit could force the 
courts to clarify that sections of the Clean Air Act do indeed provide 
for the regulation of greenhouse gases from specific sources, in which 
case the federal common law would be displaced. And this finding 
could be used to force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases under 
those sections.22 Regulations issued under these sections could provide 
for effective and efficient mechanisms to address climate change. 
On the other hand, if a court finds that no section of the Clean Air 
Act provides for the regulation of a given source’s greenhouse gas 
emissions, a federal nuisance suit could be leveraged to provide wide-
reaching remedies to states, and possibly to others,23 injured by that 
source’s emissions. Although these remedies could probably not avert 
climate change significantly,24 they could pose vast litigation risks and 
regulatory uncertainty for heavily polluting fossil fuel-reliant 
industries. These substantial liabilities could persuade industry 
actors—many of whom have stridently argued that the Clean Air Act 
does not address greenhouse gases—to warm to national legislation 
 
 20. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 21. For a discussion of the Clean Power Plan litigation, see infra Part III.B.2.  
 22. For a discussion of how clarifying that certain sections of the Clean Air Act address 
greenhouse gases could force the EPA to regulate under those sections, see infra Part IV.  
 23. The Supreme Court has never indicated whether private citizens or political subdivisions 
of states may assert federal nuisance claims. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 422 (2011). Therefore, while this 
Note is primarily addressed to states impacted by climate change, the argument here intentionally 
leaves open the possibility that others might assert these claims too.  
 24. It should be noted that a court’s inability to issue a remedy that would fully stem the tides 
of climate change would not be an insurmountable bar to standing. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows 
that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a 
favorable decision will relieve his every injury.” (alteration in original) (quoting Larson v. 
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982))).  
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that does comprehensively address these pollutants, thereby displacing 
federal nuisance suits.25  
In either case, the desired outcome of a federal nuisance suit 
would be the same: to catalyze comprehensive regulatory coverage of 
greenhouse gases in the United States.26 This is critical. Global 
temperatures are rapidly increasing toward a “tipping point,” above 
which climate change and the associated environmental, social, and 
political upheavals are projected to become increasingly catastrophic 
and self-reinforcing.27 Yet Congress has not made any significant 
efforts to address climate change since the Waxman-Markey Bill failed 
in 2009,28 and it is unlikely to do so in the near future. And the current 
administration has aggressively sought to withdraw Obama-era climate 
policies, and has reneged on the U.S. commitment to the 2015 Paris 
Climate Agreement.29 Still, national-level action is ever more critical to 
 
 25. See Colares & Ristovski, supra note 9, at 332 (suggesting that the “imposition of variable, 
potentially inconsistent and more costly litigation outcomes [could induce] industry to seek 
preemptive federal legislation to reign in such costs”). 
 26. However, given the current political climate, Congress could also pass a bill that 
expressly eviscerates the federal common law and the Clean Air Act, leaving no opportunities to 
target greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, as a tactical matter, litigants should delay bringing 
federal nuisance claims until there is a more pro-environmental administration. 
 27. We have already warmed the earth by more than one degree Celsius above preindustrial 
levels, more than halfway to the two-degree threshold that scientists have identified as the 
maximum degree of warming the earth can tolerate before the climate reaches a “tipping point.” 
Climate Change, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence [https://perma.cc/622G-2NF5]. Past this 
point, the warming effects will become self-perpetuating: as more polar ice melts, more global 
warming gases will be released and more dark surfaces will be exposed, causing places like 
Greenland to absorb more heat than they reflect—like giant asphalt parking lots. John Carey, Is 
Global Warming Happening Faster than Expected?, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2012), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-global-warming-happening-faster-than-expected 
[https://perma.cc/R4VE-U9WK]. Weather changes will cause extreme droughts across much of 
the equator, increasingly intense wildfires, and much more devastating storms. Global Warming 
Impacts, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/global-
warming/science-and-impacts/global-warming-impacts#.WFToIZJOkp8 [https://perma.cc/CA97-
YNN8]. Global food production and water availability will be severely disrupted, id., leading to 
mass population upheaval. John Vidal, Global Warming Could Create 150 Million ‘Climate 
Refugees’ By 2050, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2009/nov/03/global-warming-climate-refugees [https://perma.cc/24ER-8SAW]. 
 28. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).  
 29. Climate Deregulation Tracker, SABINE CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://
columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker [https://perma.cc/99P8-8W2T].  
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averting the most devastating impacts of climate change,30 and the 
federal common law may be a wedge to push policies in this direction.31 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the federal 
common law and displacement doctrines and discusses the relevant 
case law pertaining to the displacement of federal nuisance suits 
involving greenhouse gases. Part II analyzes the displacement test used 
in AEP and concludes that AEP and its progeny demonstrate that the 
Clean Air Act must provide a “sufficient”32 regulatory framework to 
displace a nuisance claim against a given source’s greenhouse gas 
emissions. Part III argues that because UARG demonstrates that the 
Clean Air Act does not comprehensively address greenhouse gases, it 
cannot be assumed that the Clean Air Act automatically provides a 
“sufficient” framework to regulate all stationary sources’ greenhouse 
gases.33 Because the Clean Air Act contains multiple regulatory 
 
 30. The world is currently emitting about thirty-six billion tons of carbon dioxide per year, 
and the United States is the second largest emitter. CO2 Time Series 1990–2014 per 
Region/Country, EMISSIONS DATABASE FOR GLOB. ATMOSPHERIC RES., http://edgar.
jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts1990-2014&sort=des9 [https://perma.cc/8RCG-MXNJ]. 
At the current rate of emissions, scientists project that we will exceed the two-degree Celsius 
threshold as early as 2050. Global Warming Set To Pass 2C Threshold in 2050: Report, PHY.ORG 
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://phys.org/news/2016-09-global-2c-threshold.html [https://perma.cc/
QW5W-P24P]. 
 31. Other climate litigation strategies, though important, may not be sufficient to deal with 
an interstate—and international—issue like climate change. For instance, state common law, 
unlike federal common law, requires a “clear and manifest” congressional purpose before federal 
legislation can preempt it. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981). 
However, the strategy of using state common law to target interstate pollution suffers from 
several defects, namely that it is dependent on the laws of the source state (where the pollution 
originates), not the receptor state. Source states may be more permissive of pollution and may 
even prohibit receptor states from suing on behalf of their citizens. See, e.g., North Carolina v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 309 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010) (observing that Alabama and Tennessee 
law may not permit North Carolina to bring a nuisance suit on behalf of its citizens).  
  Another climate litigation strategy, based on the doctrines of due process and the public 
trust, has had traction in the District Court of Oregon. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 
1224 (D. Or. 2016), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. 
Or. June 8, 2017). The Juliana plaintiffs—including a group of young people between the ages of 
eight and nineteen—have asserted that the United States government’s contributions to climate 
change have infringed on the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to a sustainable climate system and 
violated the government’s fiduciary duties to protect the nation’s natural resources for the benefit 
of its present and future citizens. Id. at 1233, 1239, 1254. Although this strategy is intriguing, it is 
relatively untested and is far from a slam dunk. Therefore, it should be pursued in tandem with 
federal nuisance litigation, not to its exclusion.  
 32. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 33. This Note only discuses stationary sources of greenhouse gases because the Clean Air 
Act apparently does permit the regulation of mobile sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. See 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that the Clean Air Act permits the EPA 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles).  
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authorities, this Part undertakes a section-by-section analysis of which 
provisions might allow for the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. 
It concludes that the Clean Air Act’s coverage of greenhouse gas 
emissions from existing stationary sources is uncertain and argues that 
federal nuisance suits may be viable against these types of sources. Part 
IV then argues that climate litigants should leverage federal nuisance 
claims in the face of this uncertainty to force more comprehensive 
statutory or regulatory coverage of greenhouse gases.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part provides an overview of the federal common law of 
nuisance, the displacement doctrine, and the relevant case law and 
statutory background concerning the displacement of greenhouse gas 
federal nuisance claims. It also provides a primer on the sections of the 
Clean Air Act that are relevant for the purposes of this Note.  
A. The Federal Common Law of Nuisance and Its Statutory 
Displacement  
1. Historical Roots of Federal Common Law of Nuisance.  Despite 
the familiar admonition in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins34 that 
“[t]here is no federal general common law,”35 it is “well accepted that 
the federal courts retain common lawmaking powers in particular 
areas.”36 Federal common law has historically been fashioned around 
interstate issues where resort to an individual state’s laws would be 
inappropriate to resolve the problem.37 Interstate environmental 
pollution is one area in which federal courts have traditionally retained 
their common law authority to fill “‘statutory interstices’ and, if 
necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’”38  
Federal common law environmental litigation has predominantly 
involved claims of public nuisance, which the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts defines as an “unreasonable interference with a right common to 
 
 34. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 35. Id. at 78.  
 36. Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1639, 1640 (2008). See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal 
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964) (advocating for federal common law despite Erie).  
 37. See Dan Mensher, Note, Common Law on Ice: Using Federal Judge-Made Nuisance Law 
To Address the Interstate Effects of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 467 (2007) 
(discussing how and why courts fashion federal common law).  
 38. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011) (quoting Friendly, supra note 36, at 421–22).  
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the general public.”39 Courts commonly reference the Restatement’s 
definition when considering cases arising under the federal law.40 
Public nuisance claims are typically brought by states against other 
governments or private parties to vindicate their own interests or those 
of their citizens and usually involve “significant interference with 
public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.”41  
Federal common law nuisance litigation has a pedigree dating 
back to the early twentieth century,42 but the seminal modern federal 
nuisance case—and the doctrine’s apex—is Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee (Milwaukee I).43 In that case, the State of Illinois was 
seeking injunctive relief against the City of Milwaukee and other 
Wisconsin cities, which it alleged were discharging two hundred million 
gallons of raw or undertreated sewage per day into Lake Michigan in 
violation of Illinois law.44 Though the Court declined to exercise 
original jurisdiction over the matter,45 it nevertheless affirmed that 
“[w]hen we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate 
aspects, there is a federal common law.”46 The Court acknowledged 
that Congress had addressed the matter of interstate water pollution in 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),47 but declared 
 
 39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  
 40. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Asian Carp Case), 667 F.3d 765, 780 (7th Cir. 
2011).  
 41. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 900 (7th Cir. 2014).  
 42. Robert V. Percival, The Frictions of Federalism: The Rise and Fall of the Federal 
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance 2–3 (Univ. of Md., Pub-Law Research Paper No. 2003-02, 
2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=452922 [https://perma.cc/B9F8-BPMN]. The original federal 
nuisance case concerning interstate air pollution was Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 
230 (1907) in which the Attorney General of Georgia sought and received an injunction enjoining 
a copper smelter in Tennessee from emitting sulfur gases. Id. at 236–37. Courts continued to 
develop the federal common law of interstate nuisance after Erie. See James D. Lawlor, 
Annotation, Federal Common Law of Nuisances as Basis for Relief in Environmental Pollution 
Cases, 29 A.L.R. Fed. 137 (1976) (“A number of cases, decided both before and after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Erie R. Co. v Tompkins support the proposition that a federal common-law 
nuisance action exists in environmental pollution cases.” (citation omitted)). The earliest modern 
iteration of the federal common law of interstate nuisance was Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 
(10th Cir. 1971) where the State of Texas sought to enjoin New Mexican farmers’ use of 
chlorinated pesticides that were allegedly harming surface waters in Texas. Id. at 237–38. The 
Pankey court also held that federal district courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of federal 
common law nuisance. Id. at 242. 
 43. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972).  
 44. Id. at 93.  
 45. Id. at 99. The Court found that original jurisdiction was inappropriate because of the 
availability of lower court action. Id.  
 46. Id. at 103.  
 47. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
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that “[t]he remedy sought by Illinois is not within the precise scope of 
remedies prescribed by Congress”48 and that “[u]ntil the field has been 
made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized 
administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide 
an adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal 
rights.”49 But the Court presciently noted that “new federal laws and 
new federal regulations may in time [displace] the field of federal 
common law of nuisance.”50  
2. Displacement of Federal Common Law Nuisance Claims.  
Displacement occurs when federal legislation abrogates the federal 
common law. The test for whether a federal statute displaces federal 
common law is not as demanding as the test for whether it “preempts”51 
state law,52 but if Congress is legislating against a backdrop of “long-
established and familiar principles” of federal common law, it “does 
not write upon a clean slate.”53 Rather, “courts may take it as a given 
that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the [federal 
common law] principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to 
the contrary is evident.’”54 Thus, preexisting federal common law is 
displaced only if it is evident that Congress intended to displace the 
common law, either expressly or implicitly.55  
A federal statute may implicitly displace the federal common law 
through either “field displacement” or “conflict displacement.”56 Field 
displacement occurs when a statute comprehensively “occupies the 
 
 48. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103.  
 49. Id. at 107 n.9.  
 50. Id. at 107. 
 51. Displacement and preemption are distinct concepts but are often conflated in the 
literature. Displacement refers to the federal statutory abrogation of federal common law, 
whereas preemption involves the federal abrogation of state law.  
 52. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (noting that a court will only find that a federal 
statute preempts traditional state law if it discerns a “clear and manifest purpose” of Congress to 
do so (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). 
 53. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (first quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 
343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); then quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 
108 (1991)).  
 54. Id. (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 501 U.S. at 108).  
 55. Id. (“In order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to 
the question addressed by the common law.” (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 
618, 625 (1978))).  
 56. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 
311 (2005). 
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field,” leaving no room for the common law claim.57 Under the field 
displacement theory, a comprehensive statute that is silent on an issue 
might still displace the common law, given that Congress may have 
intended to exempt the subject from regulation and common law 
claims.58 Conflict displacement, on the other hand, occurs when the 
statute conflicts with the common law, providing a “distinctly different 
remedy than would be available under the federal common law.”59 
Scholars have disagreed about whether the courts have applied field or 
conflict displacement analyses in determining whether federal 
nuisance claims are displaced by environmental laws.60 
The leading case on federal common law displacement, until AEP, 
was City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II).61 The case was based 
on the same controversy in Milwaukee I, which had worked its way 
through the lower courts back to the Supreme Court. Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the newly revised 
FWPCA—now known as the Clean Water Act62—displaced federal 
common law nuisance suits for interstate point source water 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 313. For example, in the state law preemption context (the case law on preemption 
is much more developed than the displacement literature, and, though they have different 
standards, they also share many similarities), the Supreme Court has found that federal alien 
registration law completely preempts state laws on the matter, even when the state laws 
complement the federal law, because the federal statute “was designed as a ‘harmonious whole’” 
which reflected Congress’s intent to foreclose any regulation in the area. Arizona v. United States, 
567 U.S. 387, 401–03 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72 (1941)).  
 59. Merrill, supra note 56, at 311–12. One example—again in the context of state law 
preemption—is Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) which held that a 
state law barring state entities from transacting with Burma was preempted because it directly 
conflicted with a federal statute that gave the President sole discretion to control economic 
sanctions against the country, and it penalized individuals and conduct that Congress expressly 
exempted from sanctions. Id. at 374–76, 378.  
 60. See, e.g., Van Fischer, Climate Change and Federal Common Law Nuisance: Time for 
Displacement, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 471, 479 (2011) (advocating for field displacement theory); 
Merrill, supra note 56, at 311 (noting that “Milwaukee II is ambiguous as to what the standard for 
displacement of federal common law should be”); P. Leigh Bausinger, Note, Welcome to the 
(Impenetrable) Jungle: Massachusetts v. EPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Common Law of Public 
Nuisance, 53 VILL. L. REV. 527, 533 n.36 (2008) (discussing the confusion in this area and 
attributing it in part to the loose distinction between preemption and displacement); Mensher, 
supra note 37, at 467 (advocating for a conflict displacement theory); Sarah Olinger, Note, Filling 
the Void in an Otherwise Occupied Field: Using Federal Common Law To Regulate Carbon 
Dioxide in the Absence of a Preemptive Statute, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 250 (2007) 
(suggesting that Milwaukee II is “[a] classic example of field [displacement]”).  
 61. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).  
 62. The FWPCA was thoroughly overhauled in 1972, shortly after Milwaukee I, and has not 
changed significantly since. See History of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/history-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/6YM2-FC2E].  
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pollution.63 The Court found that the statute was a “comprehensive 
regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency” 
under which “[e]very point source discharge is prohibited unless 
covered by a permit.”64 Because the only issue was “whether the field 
has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular 
manner,”65 the Court found that the Clean Water Act spoke “directly 
to [the] question” at hand, leaving no room for the federal common law 
of nuisance.66  
Before turning to how the Clean Air Act has been said to displace 
federal common law claims involving greenhouse gases, a more 
nuanced understanding of the mechanisms of the Clean Air Act is 
necessary.  
B. Primer on the Clean Air Act  
Adopted in its contemporary form in 1970, the Clean Air Act was 
intended to protect the public from air pollution caused by various 
sources broadly categorized as either mobile or stationary. The statute 
is often cited as the archetype of cooperative federalism, where the 
delegation of authority to set regulatory standards and enforce them is 
split between the EPA and the states.67 The statute contains different, 
overlapping frameworks for addressing air pollution, and any given 
source or pollutant could potentially be regulated under multiple 
sections of the Clean Air Act. This Section provides an “aerial” view 
of the Clean Air Act’s sections and mechanisms that are relevant for 
the purposes of this Note.  
The linchpins of the Clean Air Act are the “national ambient air 
quality standards” (NAAQS), which are ambient standards that apply 
to “criteria pollutants” emitted by diverse sources. Under Section 108, 
the EPA has significant discretion to identify and list criteria 
pollutants,68 but once it does, it must set maximum permissible ambient 
 
 63. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 332.  
 64. Id. at 317–18 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 65. Id. at 324.  
 66. Id. at 315. Two months later, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme Court went one step further, declaring “that the 
federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more 
comprehensive scope of the [CWA].” Id. at 22.  
 67. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 
1197–99 (1995).  
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2018). Different sections of the Clean Air Act are generally referred 
to as they appear in the Clean Air Act itself, as opposed to the corresponding provisions of the 
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levels—NAAQS—for each pollutant under Section 109.69 The EPA 
has only listed NAAQS for six pollutants—carbon monoxide, lead, 
nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide.70 
Once the EPA sets the NAAQS, states must submit “[s]tate 
implementation plans” that ensure compliance with the NAAQS for 
each criteria pollutant.71 These plans are flexible and apply to both 
mobile and stationary sources of pollutants. If the state does not submit 
a state implementation plan or the plan is deficient, the EPA can 
promulgate a “[f]ederal implementation plan” instead.72 There are also 
various mechanisms to prevent one state from interfering with another 
state’s compliance with the NAAQS.73  
Once the EPA promulgates a NAAQS for a criteria pollutant, 
states must determine whether they comply with the ambient standard. 
Areas within a state that comply are considered attainment areas, and 
those that do not are designated nonattainment areas.74 To keep 
attainment areas from getting dirtier, the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) program in Sections 160–169 of the Clean Air Act 
requires new and modified major stationary sources of “any air 
pollutant”75 in those areas to obtain permits and install the “best 
available control technology” (BACT) for their emissions. The BACT 
is set on a source-by-source basis.76  
For nonattainment areas, under the Clean Air Act Sections 171–
193, new and modified major sources must install control technology 
to meet the “lowest achievable emission rate.”77 In addition, both new 
and existing sources must use “reasonably available control 
technology” to reduce their emissions.78  
 
United States Code. For a list of the conversions between the Clean Air Act and the Code 
sections, see Clean Air Act Overview, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-
act-text [https://perma.cc/3ZU4-EGSB].  
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 7409.  
 70. Criteria Air Pollutants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants [https://perma.
cc/4PJ7-LVYK]. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.  
 72. Id.  
 73. E.g. id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (SIP challenges); id. § 7426(b) (petitions to the EPA); id. § 
7410(k)(5) (SIP calls).  
 74. Id. § 7407(d). 
 75. The definition of air pollution here is the issue in UARG. For a discussion of the Court’s 
interpretation in UARG, see infra Part I.C.3.  
 76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492.  
 77. Id. §§ 7501–7515.  
 78. Id.  
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Apart from the NAAQS process, the Clean Air Act contains 
various authorities that set emission standards for stationary sources of 
air pollutants without reference to an area’s attainment or 
nonattainment status. For instance, under Section 111, the EPA sets 
“new source performance standards” for emissions of air pollutants 
from new or modified stationary sources that fit within categories of 
sources designated by the EPA. These standards are based on the “best 
system of emission reduction” and must consider cost.79 Under Section 
111(d), the EPA may also set best system of emissions reduction 
standards for existing categories of stationary sources if they could be 
regulated as new sources under the new source performance 
standards.80  
In addition, under Section 112, the EPA promulgates “national 
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants,” including mercury 
and other air toxics.81 Major sources of hazardous air pollutants must 
install the “maximum achievable control technology” to reduce their 
emissions.82 This technology-based standard is supplemented by a 
health-based backstop, which requires the EPA to issue more stringent 
standards to reduce residual health risks if the maximum achievable 
control technology has not reduced the pollutant to a level that is 
protective of public health.83  
Other relevant portions of the Clean Air Act include: Title V, 
Section 115 and Title VI. Title V contains no substantive emissions 
limits, but requires that all other emissions requirements for major 
facilities be compiled into one permitting document.84 Section 115 of 
the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to require states to adjust their state 
implementation plans to address international harms caused by 
domestic emissions.85 Title VI contains various mechanisms for 
addressing stratospheric ozone depletion.86  
 
 79. Id. §§ 7411(a)–(c).  
 80. Id. § 7411(d). There is also a question of whether Section 111(d) requires that the source 
not be regulated under Section 112. For a discussion of the litigation involving this issue, see infra 
Part III.B.2.  
 81. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 112, 84 Stat. 1685 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 7412.  
 84. Id. §§ 7602(j), 7661–7661f.  
 85. Id. § 7415.  
 86. Id. §§ 7671–7671q. 
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On the whole, the Clean Air Act provides various mechanisms for 
regulating a given source of air pollution. These mechanisms may be 
available at the EPA’s discretion or automatically applicable 
depending on the nature of the pollutant itself, what type of source is 
emitting the pollution, the volume of pollution the source has the 
potential to emit, whether the source is stationary or mobile, and where 
the source is located. Emission reductions are achieved either by the 
EPA setting maximum ambient pollutant levels, which are attained 
through state implementation plans (with federal backstops), or by the 
EPA requiring specific sources or source categories to meet 
technological or performance standards for emissions of specific 
pollutants. As it turns out, the interlocking yet distinct mechanisms by 
which the Clean Air Act addresses air pollution play a critical role in 
the displacement (or lack thereof) of greenhouse gas nuisance claims.  
C. The Displacement of Federal Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Claims 
and Its Potential Undoing 
There are three Supreme Court cases relevant to the displacement 
of federal common law nuisance claims involving greenhouse gases: 
Massachusetts v. EPA,87 AEP, and UARG. The first, Massachusetts v. 
EPA, held that the Clean Air Act’s broad statutory definition of “air 
pollutant” plainly encompassed greenhouse gases. The second, AEP, 
found that, because the Clean Air Act addressed greenhouse gases, it 
also displaced federal common law claims involving those pollutants. 
The third, UARG, held, contrary to an implicit assumption in AEP, 
that the Clean Air Act’s coverage of greenhouse gases is not in fact 
comprehensive, but is section- and context-specific.  
1. Massachusetts v. EPA: The Clean Air Act Plainly Encompasses 
Greenhouse Gases.  The harbinger of AEP was Massachusetts v. EPA, 
which answered a long-asked question: whether the Clean Air Act 
addresses greenhouse gas emissions.88 The case traces back to 1999, 
when a group of nineteen private advocacy groups petitioned the EPA 
to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles under Section 
 
 87. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 88. Id. at 505. Massachusetts is more widely known for its contribution to constitutional 
standing doctrine—that states in their capacity as “quasi-sovereign[s]” enjoy “special solicitude” 
in the standing analysis. Id. at 520. Though standing (and states’ comparative advantage in 
overcoming the hurdle of demonstrating the particularized injury element thereof) would be an 
important factor in any federal nuisance suit, it is not the focus of this Note and is therefore not 
discussed further.  
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202 of the Clean Air Act.89 After the EPA declined, Massachusetts and 
several other non-state plaintiffs asked the D.C. Circuit to review the 
EPA’s decision.90 The D.C. Circuit found that the EPA had permissibly 
exercised its discretion not to regulate greenhouse gases,91 and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006.92  
The Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens writing for the majority, 
found that the Clean Air Act’s “capacious” definition of air pollution 
plainly encompassed greenhouse gases.93 Accordingly, the Court held 
that the “EPA has the statutory authority to regulate the emission of 
such gases from new motor vehicles”94 and that its decision whether to 
regulate under Section 202 could only rest on the factors prescribed in 
that section—whether greenhouse gases “cause, or contribute to, air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”95 Because the EPA had relied on other factors in 
choosing not to regulate greenhouse gases, the Court found that the 
decision was arbitrary and capricious.96  
Four years after Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court in AEP relied 
on Massachusetts when it found that a federal nuisance suit concerning 
several power plants’ greenhouse gas emissions was displaced by the 
Clean Air Act.97  
2. AEP: The Ostensible Death Knell for Federal Nuisance Claims 
for Greenhouse Gases.  In AEP, the plaintiffs sought a court injunction 
that would require four private companies and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) to “cap [their] carbon dioxide emissions and then 
reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a 
decade.”98 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ contributions to 
global warming violated the federal common law of nuisance, or 
 
 89. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
 90. Id. at 53.  
 91. Id. at 58.  
 92. Massachusetts v. EPA, 548 U.S. 903 (2006) (mem.).  
 93. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 500.  
 94. Id. at 532.  
 95. Id. at 506 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)).  
 96. Id. at 534. Instead, the EPA argued, inter alia, that existing executive branch programs 
already effectively addressed climate change and that regulating greenhouse gas emissions might 
impair the President’s ability to negotiate internationally. Id. at 536.  
 97. For a discussion of AEP’s reliance on Massachusetts, see infra Part III.A.  
 98. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 419 (2011) (citation omitted).  
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alternatively, the nuisance laws of the source states.99 The district court 
dismissed the case, finding that it presented a political question,100 but 
the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the issue was justiciable.101 
Turning to the merits, the Second Circuit held that the defendants’ 
actions constituted a public nuisance under federal common law, which 
was not displaced because the EPA had not yet regulated in the area.102  
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and 
held that the plaintiffs’ federal nuisance claim was displaced by the 
Clean Air Act.103 Surveying the case law, Justice Ginsburg articulated 
a deceptively simple summary of the displacement doctrine: “The test 
for whether congressional legislation [displaces] federal common law 
is simply whether the statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at 
issue.”104 Because “Massachusetts made plain that emissions of carbon 
dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to regulation under the [Clean 
Air] Act,” the Court found that it was “equally plain that the [Clean 
Air] Act ‘speaks directly’ to emissions of carbon dioxide from the 
defendants’ plants.”105 Accordingly, the Court found that, because the 
Clean Air Act speaks directly to the issue of greenhouse gas emissions, 
the federal common law was displaced.106  
Justice Ginsburg went on to note that Section 111 of the Clean Air 
Act enables the EPA to set performance standards for new and existing 
stationary sources of greenhouse gases, including power plants. She 
emphasized that the Clean Air Act “provides multiple avenues for 
enforcement” of these standards, including civil and criminal penalties 
enforceable by the EPA, states, and private citizens.107 And if the EPA 
fails to promulgate these standards, states and private parties may 
 
 99. Id. at 418. In general, if the federal common law is available, then state common law 
claims are not. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987) (noting that if a case 
“should be resolved by reference to federal common law” then “state common law [is] pre-
empted”).  
 100. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).  
 101. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 332, rev’d, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).  
 102. Id. at 379 (alteration in original) (“We cannot say, therefore, that EPA’s issuance of 
proposed findings suffices to regulate greenhouse gases in a way that ‘speaks directly’ to Plaintiffs’ 
problems and thereby displaces Plaintiffs’ existing remedies under the federal common law.”).  
 103. AEP, 564 U.S. at 429. 
 104. Id. at 424 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).  
 105. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007)). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 425.  
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petition the EPA to regulate, after which those parties have a right to 
review in federal court.108 Therefore, the Court concluded that “[t]he 
Act itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon 
dioxide from domestic powerplants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek 
by invoking federal common law. We see no room for a parallel 
track.”109 
In addition, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Second Circuit’s 
analysis that the federal common law is only displaced when the EPA 
regulates the matter in fact. Citing Milwaukee II, the Court noted that 
“the relevant question for purposes of displacement is ‘whether the 
field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a 
particular manner.’”110 “The critical point,” according to Justice 
Ginsburg, “is that Congress delegated to [the] EPA the decision 
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from 
powerplants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law.”111 
The Court remanded the state common law claims because the parties 
had not briefed the issue of whether the Clean Air Act preempts state 
common law.112  
3. UARG: The Clean Air Act’s Greenhouse Gas Coverage Is Not 
Comprehensive.  In UARG, several states and industry groups 
challenged two interrelated EPA rules—the “Triggering Rule”113 and 
the “Tailoring Rule”114—that sought to force certain new and modified 
sources of greenhouse gases to install BACT and obtain Title V 
permits.115 Before issuing the rule, the EPA had issued a finding that it 
believed that greenhouse gases endangered public health116 and then 
proceeded to regulate mobile sources’ greenhouse gas emissions under 
 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 426.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 429. Because a federal law must evince a clear statement of intent to displace a 
state law, AEP’s finding that the federal common law was displaced by the Clean Air Act did not 
necessarily mean that state common law was also preempted. Id. 
 113. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by 
Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010).  
 114. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010).  
 115. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2437 (2014). 
 116. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009). The six pollutants were 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur 
hexafluoride. Id.  
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Section 202.117 The EPA believed that once it regulated greenhouse 
gases as “air pollutants” under Section 202, it was also required to 
regulate them under the PSD and Title V programs, which both 
contain mandatory regulatory requirements for specified sources that 
have the potential to emit “major” quantities of “any air pollutant.”118 
But because greenhouse gases are often emitted in much greater 
quantities than other pollutants, the EPA issued a “Tailoring Rule,” 
that restricted the PSD and Title V requirements only to sources 
already subject to PSD requirements because of their emission of 
criteria pollutants—so called “anyway sources”—and to sources with 
the potential to emit more than one hundred thousand tons of carbon 
dioxide per year.119  
In the initial litigation in the D.C. Circuit,120 a unanimous panel 
held that the EPA’s interpretation that new and modified “major” 
sources of greenhouse gases would be subject to the PSD requirements 
was “compelled by the statute.” 121 Thus, the court found it was “crystal 
clear that PSD permittees must install BACT for greenhouse gases.”122 
The petitioners appealed, and in 2013, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the issue of whether the EPA had permissibly determined 
that its regulation of greenhouse gases from mobile sources triggered 
the PSD or Title V requirements.123  
The Supreme Court in UARG held that the phrase “any air 
pollutant” used in the PSD and Title V sections could not be construed 
 
 117. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,326–27 (May 7, 2010).  
 118. The PSD program requires, among other things, that a new or modified “major emitting 
facility” in an attainment area obtain a PSD permit. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C) (2018). 
A “major emitting facility” has the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” or, 
for certain sources, one hundred tons per year. Id. § 7479(1). Among other requirements of the 
PSD program, the source must install emission controls that reflect “best available control 
technology” for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Clean Air Act. Id. § 7475(a)(4). 
In addition, Title V requires “major source[s]” to obtain a permit that reflects all of the other 
emission standards required under the rest of the Clean Air Act. Id. § 7661a(a). For the purpose 
of Title V, a “major source” has the potential to emit one hundred tons per year of “any air 
pollutant.” Id. §§ 7661(2)(B), 7602(j); see also UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2435–36 (discussing the PSD 
and Title V requirements).  
 119. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 31,516.  
 120. Certain challenges to regulations issued under the Clean Air Act must be brought 
directly in the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).  
 121. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 133–34 (2012) (per curiam), 
rev’d sub nom. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).  
 122. Id. at 137.  
 123. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2438 (2014).  
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to include greenhouse gases.124 However, the Court nevertheless found 
that the EPA could continue to treat greenhouse gases as “pollutant[s] 
subject to regulation” for the purpose of requiring BACT for “anyway” 
sources, which are already subject to PSD regulations because of their 
criteria pollutant emissions.125  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that the EPA’s 
interpretation of the triggering language in the PSD and Title V 
programs was unreasonable because it would subject thousands of 
relatively small sources of carbon dioxide to heavy regulatory burdens 
without a clear statement of congressional intent to do so.126 Justice 
Scalia distinguished Massachusetts, noting that the Act-wide definition 
of air pollutant “is not a command to regulate, but a description of the 
universe of substances the EPA may consider regulating under the 
Clean Air Act’s operative provisions.”127 The Court emphasized that 
the regulation must be reasonable in the context of the section at 
issue.128 Because the PSD and Title V programs carry “heavy 
substantive and procedural burdens,”129 Justice Scalia found that it was 
unreasonable to regulate sources under those programs merely for 
their capacity to emit greenhouse gases. Justice Scalia noted that the 
vast economic reach of the EPA’s interpretation reduced the deference 
due by the Court to the EPA, and stressed that “[w]e expect Congress 
to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast 
‘economic and political significance.’”130 The Court found that the 
EPA’s interpretation could not be saved by its Tailoring Rule, because 
the rule was effectively an administrative rewrite of the unambiguous 
language of the Clean Air Act.131  
Nevertheless, the Court held that the BACT requirements could 
still apply to “anyway sources.” Justice Scalia noted that the BACT 
language, which applies only to “each pollutant subject to regulation,” 
 
 124. Id. at 2448–49. Perhaps acknowledging that this was not the obvious textual reading of 
the Clean Air Act, the Court conceded that “[t]o be sure, Congress’s profligate use of ‘air 
pollutant’ where what is meant is obviously narrower than the Act-wide definition is not 
conducive to clarity.” Id. at 2441.  
 125. Id. at 2449.  
 126. Id. at 2443–44. 
 127. Id. at 2441 (emphasis omitted).  
 128. Id. (stressing that “words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to 
their place in the overall statutory scheme” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000))).  
 129. Id. at 2443.  
 130. Id. at 2444 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160).  
 131. Id. at 2446.  
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was far less open-ended and less subject to “dramatic expansion of 
agency authority” than the triggering language in the PSD and Title V 
sections.132 Moreover, sources that were already subject to the PSD and 
Title V requirements because of their criteria pollutant emissions 
would be larger and more capable of shouldering the burdens of 
complying with BACT and Title V regulatory requirements for their 
greenhouse gas emissions.133  
Thus, UARG demonstrated that the Clean Air Act does not 
comprehensively address greenhouse gases throughout its sections. 
Instead, it set out a context-specific test whereby any given section may 
only be said to encompass greenhouse gases if it can be reasonably 
construed to do so, given the economic impact of a regulation under 
that section and the clarity of the statutory language.  
II.  ANALYZING THE DISPLACEMENT TEST EMPLOYED IN AEP 
This Part argues that AEP’s displacement analysis demonstrates 
that merely legislating in the area of greenhouse gases or being silent 
on the issue is insufficient to imply a legislative purpose to displace the 
federal common law. Rather, as two post-AEP cases show, a statute 
must provide for source-specific emission standards, enforcement 
options, and remedies before it can be said to provide a “sufficient” 
regulatory framework to displace the federal common law.  
A. AEP: A Hybrid of Conflict and Field Displacement  
Commentators have disagreed about whether AEP used a field or 
conflict displacement analysis in determining whether the Clean Air 
Act displaced federal nuisance claims.134 Language in the opinion 
supports both theories. For instance, Justice Ginsburg rearticulated the 
classic field displacement language from Milwaukee II, stating that “the 
relevant question for purposes of displacement is ‘whether the field has 
been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular 
 
 132. Id. at 2448.  
 133. Id. at 2448–49.  
 134. Compare Sidney F. Ansbacher, Lawyers Weigh in on AEP v. Conn., LAW360 (June 20, 
2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/252467/lawyers-weigh-in-on-aep-v-conn [https://
perma.cc/RUK4-3LGF] (arguing that AEP recognized a field displacement theory, which 
“follows logically from the court’s decision in Massachusetts v. USEPA that held greenhouse gases 
are pollutants that the Clean Air Act regulates”), with Molly M. Watters, Note, Fish and 
Federalism: How the Asian Carp Litigation Highlights a Deficiency in the Federal Common Law 
Displacement Analysis, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 535, 557 (2013) (noting that “[t]he Court 
[in AEP] applied the conflict displacement rationale”).  
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manner.’”135 The Court seemed to conclude that the field was indeed 
occupied, noting that “Massachusetts made plain that emissions of 
carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to regulation under the 
[Clean Air] Act.”136 
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s analysis also contained 
elements of conflict displacement. Section 111, the opinion posited, 
provides a means for the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from power plants.137 It contains enforcement mechanisms and enables 
citizens and states to petition the EPA to regulate specific sources or 
pollutants.138 Moreover, states and citizens may seek redress in the 
courts for the EPA’s failure to regulate.139 Accordingly, Justice 
Ginsburg concluded that:  
[t]he Act itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of 
carbon dioxide from domestic powerplants—the same relief the 
plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law. We see no room for 
a parallel track.140 
This suggests that the field displacement theory contending that 
silence in a comprehensive statute may evince a legislative intent not 
to regulate is incompatible with AEP’s reasoning.141 Otherwise, the 
Court could have simply stopped once it concluded that the Clean Air 
Act regulates greenhouse gases. Instead, it carefully parsed the text of 
the statute and emphasized that the Clean Air Act must provide a 
“means to seek limits on emissions of [greenhouse gases] from [a 
specific source]” for federal nuisance claims to be displaced as to that 
source.142 
Accordingly, it seems that merely legislating in the field of 
greenhouse gas nuisance law is insufficient to displace the federal 
common law. Rather, the Court must be satisfied that Congress 
delegated the authority to regulate the particular matter by “speak[ing] 
directly to [the] question” in the statutory text.143 Though Congress is 
 
 135. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011) (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981)).  
 136. Id. at 424 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007)).  
 137. Id. at 424–25.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 425.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Cf. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (stressing that statutory silence is 
insufficient to displace long-standing federal common law).  
 142. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 425 (2011).  
 143. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981).  
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free to choose the “particular manner” by which to address an issue, it 
nevertheless must “provide[] a sufficient legislative solution to the 
particular [issue] to warrant a conclusion” that the legislation speaks 
directly to it.144 The question then becomes: “[H]ow much 
congressional action is enough?”145  
B. What Constitutes A “Sufficient Legislative Solution” 
Two post-AEP cases, Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(Asian Carp Case),146 and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp.,147 have sought to answer this question. In the Asian Carp Case, 
five states bordering the Great Lakes brought a federal common law 
public nuisance suit against the Army Corps of Engineers to enjoin it 
from permitting the introduction of invasive carp into the Great 
Lakes.148 Considering the displacement doctrine espoused by AEP and 
its predecessors, the Seventh Circuit found that “[t]he important 
displacement question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient 
legislative solution to the particular interstate nuisance here to warrant 
a conclusion that this legislation has occupied the field to the exclusion 
of federal common law.”149 Applying this test, the court held that that 
the states’ nuisance claim was not displaced even though “Congress has 
not been mute on the subject of the carp.”150 The court emphasized that 
Congress’s “narrow delegation” of power to the Corps to investigate 
and study invasive carp did not contain “any enforcement mechanism 
or recourse for any entity or party negatively affected by the carp.”151 
Thus, the court concluded that the legislation had not displaced the 
states’ claim, because it was more similar to the original Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act at issue in Milwaukee I than the Clean Air Act 
 
 144. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (second 
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Asian Carp Case, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 
2011)).  
 145. Id.  
 146. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Asian Carp Case), 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 147. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 148. Asian Carp Case, 667 F.3d at 768.  
 149. Id. at 777.  
 150. Id. Congress had permitted the Corps to construct an electric barrier preventing the carp 
from passing through the Chicago River Ship and Sanitary Canal into the Great Lakes, and had 
provided for numerous studies on how to control aquatic nuisance species. Id. at 779–80.  
 151. Id. at 780.  
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or the amended Clean Water Act at issue in AEP and Milwaukee II, 
respectively.152  
In Kivalina, the Alaskan city of Kivalina and a village of Inupiat 
Native Alaskans brought a federal nuisance claim against multiple 
energy companies.153 The tribe and village were seeking damages for 
“[m]assive erosion” threatening the “imminent devastation” of their 
community, which they alleged was caused by global warming 
attributable to the defendants’ energy production.154 The Ninth Circuit 
applied the analysis in the Asian Carp Case to the Clean Air Act, 
asking whether the statute presented a “sufficient legislative solution” 
to displace the plaintiffs’ federal nuisance claim for damages.155 The 
Ninth Circuit emphasized that “the lack of a federal remedy may be a 
factor to be considered in determining whether Congress has displaced 
federal common law,” but it clarified that, unlike the traditional 
conflict displacement theory, the type of remedy provided by Congress 
was not to be considered when evaluating whether the Clean Air Act 
displaces federal nuisance claims.156 Thus, the court found that AEP 
applied, and that the Clean Air Act displaced the plaintiffs’ federal 
nuisance claim, even though they were seeking damages, not injunctive 
relief.157  
This gloss on the displacement analysis suggests that the Clean Air 
Act must contain three major components to constitute “a sufficient 
legislative solution”158 displacing the federal common law: (1) authority 
to set regulatory standards; (2) a mechanism to enforce those 
standards; and (3) some sort of remedy or recourse for affected parties. 
Because Justice Ginsburg in AEP was satisfied that the Clean Air Act 
contains all three elements as applied to greenhouse gases, she 
concluded that the federal nuisance claim was displaced. But, as 
discussed below, this basic assumption was undermined by UARG.  
 
 152. Id. Decided in 2011 before UARG, this case also apparently assumed that the Clean Air 
Act comprehensively regulated greenhouse gases. See id. at 778 (noting that, in AEP, “[t]he Court 
found it important that the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to identify and establish performance 
standards for all carbon-dioxide emitters” (emphasis added)).  
 153. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 154. Id. at 853.  
 155. Id. at 856.  
 156. Id. at 857 (emphasis added).  
 157. Id. at 858.  
 158. Asian Carp Case, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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III.  REEVALUATING THE CLEAN AIR ACT’S DISPLACEMENT OF 
FEDERAL COMMON LAW GREENHOUSE GAS NUISANCE CLAIMS 
AFTER UARG  
This Part contends that UARG undermined a core premise of 
AEP—that the Clean Air Act comprehensively addresses greenhouse 
gases—and instead set out a contextual test for determining whether a 
given section of the Clean Air Act can be construed to address those 
pollutants. Applying this test to the five sections of the Clean Air Act 
that might be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
stationary sources, this Part finds that only two sections, Sections 
111(d) and 115, might credibly encompass greenhouse gas emissions, 
but both sections’ coverage is far from certain. This Part concludes that, 
if these sources are not regulated under either of these sections, then 
the Clean Air Act cannot be said to present a “sufficient legislative 
solution” as required by AEP, and federal nuisance claims would again 
be available as to those sources.  
A. UARG Undermined AEP and Created a New Context-Specific 
Test  
In UARG, Justice Scalia found that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion 
upholding the EPA’s interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggering 
language was based on a flawed syllogism: “Under Massachusetts, the 
general, Act-wide definition of ‘air pollutant’ includes greenhouse 
gases; the Clean Air Act requires permits for major emitters of ‘any air 
pollutant’; therefore, the Clean Air Act requires permits for major 
emitters of greenhouse gases.”159 But Justice Scalia noted that “[t]he 
conclusion follows from the premises only if the air pollutants referred 
to in the permit-requiring provisions (the minor premise) are the same 
air pollutants encompassed by the Act-wide definition as interpreted 
in Massachusetts (the major premise).”160 This proposition, according 
to the Court, was “obviously untenable.”161 
The Court in AEP seems to have rested its decision on the same 
flawed syllogism. AEP employed none of UARG’s contextual analysis; 
it did not ask whether interpreting Section 111 to regulate greenhouse 
gases would be reasonable, or whether a “clear statement” should be 
required given the potentially vast economic and political significance 
 
 159. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014). 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
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of regulating greenhouse gases under the section. Instead it 
unhesitatingly assumed that Section 111 provided for the regulation of 
greenhouse gases, noting that because “Massachusetts made plain that 
emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to 
regulation under the [Clean Air] Act,” it was “equally plain that the 
[Clean Air] Act ‘speaks directly’ to emissions of carbon dioxide from 
the defendants’ plants.”162  
AEP’s uncritical conclusion that Section 111 provided for the 
regulation of greenhouse gases appears to have been based on an 
assumption drawn from Massachusetts v. EPA that the Clean Air Act 
comprehensively addressed greenhouse gases.163 Indeed, the D.C. 
Circuit, the EPA and many others apparently believed this exact 
premise—that the Clean Air Act’s act-wide definition of “air 
pollutant” meant that greenhouse gases were addressed throughout 
the statute.164 But because UARG demonstrates that the Clean Air Act 
does not comprehensively address greenhouse gases, it can no longer 
be assumed that federal nuisance suits against stationary sources’ 
greenhouse gas emissions are displaced in every context. Instead, the 
claims would only be displaced if a specific section or sections of the 
Clean Air Act provide for “sufficient” regulation of those sources.165  
 
 162. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 
(2007)).  
 163. Even Justice Alito, who concurred in the judgment of AEP, seemed to assume that 
Massachusetts held that the Clean Air Act comprehensively addressed greenhouse gases. Id. at 
430 (Alito, J. concurring) (“I concur in the judgment, and I agree with the Court’s displacement 
analysis on the assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party contends 
otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act, adopted by the majority in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, is correct.” (citations omitted)). 
 164. See, e.g., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
44,354, 44,354 (July 30, 2008) (discussing “the various [Clean Air Act] provisions that may be 
applicable to regulate [greenhouse gases]” and noting that Massachusetts “ruled that the Clean 
Air Act . . . authorize[d] regulation of greenhouse gases”); Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. 
v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom., UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 
(2014) (noting that Massachusetts “clarified that greenhouse gases are an ‘air pollutant’ subject to 
regulation under the Clean Air Act”); cf. RICHARD REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 
687 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that the basic approach of the Clean Air Act, like other command-and-
control statutes, is to “list a number of pollutants and regulate them comprehensively” (emphasis 
added)).  
 165. It should be noted that it does not appear that any other statutes provide a sufficient 
legislative solution to be said to displace federal public nuisance suits in the context of greenhouse 
gases. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 379 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 
410 (2011) (surveying all federal legislation concerning greenhouse gases and concluding that 
none of it displaced federal nuisance claims); see also Mensher, supra note 37, at 484 (reaching 
the same conclusion). Environmental groups have petitioned the EPA to use other federal 
environmental statutes like the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Endangered Species Act 
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Determining whether a given section of the Clean Air Act 
provides for the regulation of a source’s greenhouse gas emissions 
requires the same contextual analysis employed in UARG. There are 
two questions central to the UARG test: first, whether it is reasonable 
in the context of a given section to assume that the provision’s use of 
the term “air pollutant” encompasses greenhouse gases; and second, 
for cases in which the regulation would grant the EPA authority of 
“vast ‘economic and political significance,’” whether the text “speak[s] 
clearly” to the matter.166 
B. Applying the UARG Test to the Clean Air Act: Are There Gaps in 
Greenhouse Coverage?  
Applying this test, UARG itself found that greenhouse gas 
emissions of “anyway sources”—new or modified stationary sources 
located in attainment areas—can be regulated under the PSD and Title 
V programs. Because these programs apparently provide for the 
regulation of covered sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, federal 
nuisance claims against these sources are probably displaced. But there 
are still many other stationary sources—especially existing sources that 
have not been modified, which are not covered under these sections. 
Whether federal nuisance claims against these sources are displaced 
requires a careful analysis applying the UARG test to each potentially 
relevant section of the Clean Air Act.  
Five sections of the Clean Air Act might be used to address 
existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. They are Sections 108 and 
109 (the NAAQS program); Section 111(d) (performance standards 
for certain categories of existing sources); Section 112 (hazardous air 
pollutants); Section 115 (international air pollution); and Section 615 
(stratospheric ozone). Only if none of these sections apply would a 
federal nuisance suit be viable.  
 
to create substantive limitations on greenhouse emissions, but they have not been successful. See, 
e.g., Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Ocean Acidification; TSCA Section 21 Petition; Reasons for 
Agency Response, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,577 (Oct. 7, 2015) (denying a petition to regulate greenhouse 
gases under TSCA).  
 166. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)); see also Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1933, 1943 ( 2017) (discussing the “power canons,” including the “clear statement” 
doctrine espoused in UARG); cf. Michigan v. EPA., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (citing UARG in 
declining to give deference to the EPA’s interpretation that the Clean Air Act Section 112(j) does 
not require the consideration of cost). 
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1. Sections 108 and 109—NAAQS.  Sections 108 and 109 provide 
mechanisms for the EPA to develop ambient standards for criteria 
pollutants, which states then apply to new and existing mobile and 
stationary sources. Section 108 directs the EPA Administrator to list 
criteria air pollutants which “in his judgment, cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare” and “the presence of which in the ambient air results 
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.”167 For each 
criteria pollutant, Section 109 in turn directs the EPA to promulgate a 
national ambient air quality standard at a level “requisite to protect the 
public health” with an “adequate margin of safety.”168  
It is unlikely that Sections 108 and 109 could be interpreted to 
address greenhouse gases, as doing so would yield the same untenably 
high administrative costs and regulatory burdens that the Court 
recoiled from in UARG. For one, designating greenhouse gases as 
criteria pollutants would cause PSD and Title V requirements to apply 
to the same small sources that UARG already found could not be 
regulated under those programs.169 Moreover, the EPA is not 
permitted to consider costs when determining the ambient levels of 
greenhouse gases that are protective of public health with an adequate 
margin of safety,170 which could result in crushing costs on states and 
industry to come into compliance with whatever standard is chosen by 
the EPA. And because greenhouse gases are globally mixing 
pollutants, it would be difficult if not impossible for a state to 
individually attain any ambient standard set by EPA. Thus, it appears 
that, under the contextual reasonableness test of UARG, Sections 108 
and 109 probably do not provide for the regulation of greenhouse 
gases.  
2. Section 111(d)—Existing Source Performance Standards.  
Section 111 enables the EPA to set new source performance standards 
for designated categories of new and modified stationary sources171 and 
symmetrical standards for existing sources.172 The AEP Court explicitly 
assumed that greenhouse gases could be regulated under Section 
 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2018).  
 168. Id. § 7409(b)(1).  
 169. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s criticism of this issue in UARG, see Part I.C.3.  
 170. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (“The text of § 109(b) . . . 
unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process . . . .”).  
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b).  
 172. Id. § 7411(d).  
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111,173 and the UARG Court conceded that the section might not be “ill 
suited to accommodating greenhouse gases.”174 Despite these powerful 
pronouncements, opponents have challenged the EPA’s authority to 
regulate power plants’ emissions of greenhouse gases under Section 
111.175  
In 2015, the EPA issued its final rule on greenhouse gas emissions 
from existing power plants: the Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines 
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 
known colloquially as the Clean Power Plan.176 The Clean Power Plan 
established state-specific requirements for carbon dioxide reductions 
from the power sector, based on a combination of increased efficiency, 
trading, and transitions to natural gases and renewables.177 On the same 
day the Plan was published, twenty-seven states and a broad coalition 
of industry opponents sued the EPA in the D.C. Circuit, levelling a 
bevy of statutory and constitutional challenges against the EPA’s 
interpretation of Section 111(d).178 The Supreme Court stayed the 
Clean Power Plan pending a decision by the D.C. Circuit.179 However, 
on October, 16 2017, the Trump administration issued a proposal to 
repeal the regulation,180 and the D.C. Circuit has granted the 
 
 173. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 425 (2011) (examining Section 111 and concluding that “[t]he Act 
itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic 
powerplants”).  
 174. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 n.5 (2014).  
 175. The main case challenging the EPA’s 111(b) authority to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from new and modified power plants is North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. 
filed Oct. 23, 2015). However, the primary arguments in North Dakota are not whether Section 
111(b) permits the regulation of new sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, but rather how the EPA 
went about developing the regulations. See State Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 13–24, North 
Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015) (arguing that the EPA did not apply 
the correct legal standard to its determination that a proposed system of emission reduction was 
adequately supported). Since it is not substantially contested that Section 111(b) provides for the 
regulation of greenhouse gases from new or modified major sources, federal common law 
nuisance claims against these sources—which may also be subject to BACT due to their criteria 
pollutant emissions—are probably displaced. Thus, the main question is whether existing sources 
of greenhouse gases can be regulated under Section 111(d). 
 176. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 177. Id. 
 178. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. argued Sept. 27, 2016); Clean Power Plan 
Case Resources, supra note 19.  
 179. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.). 
 180. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
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administration’s request to hold the case in abeyance during the repeal 
process.181  
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that the D.C. Circuit will issue a 
decision on the merits in this case, leaving resolution of the scope of 
the EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse gases under Section 111(d) 
for another day.182 However, the arguments raised by the petitioners in 
West Virginia remain relevant to this Note because their resolution is 
necessary to determine whether, and to what extent, Section 111(d) 
provides for the regulation of greenhouse gases. The major arguments 
can be broken into three categories: first, that the EPA impermissibly 
regulated beyond the “fence line” of the source facilities;183 second, 
that sources which are regulated under Section 112 cannot be regulated 
under Section 111(d); and third, that the Clean Power Plan 
unconstitutionally commandeers the states’ authority to regulate their 
power sectors.184  
The petitioners’ first argument—that the EPA cannot regulate 
beyond the fence line—addresses the question of whether, in crafting 
the Clean Power Plan, the EPA improperly considered emissions 
reductions that could not be accomplished by the equipment within the 
boundaries of the source facilities themselves. In the Clean Power Plan, 
the EPA construed Section 111’s “best system of emission reduction” 
requirement to include market-scale, generation-shifting measures and 
increased use of renewables.185 The petitioners have argued that this 
was an impermissible construction of the statute and that Section 
111(d) permits the EPA to set emissions standards based only on 
measures that can be applied to individual sources, such as adopting 
 
 181. The D.C. Circuit first granted the Trump administration’s request to hold the case in 
abeyance while it reconsidered the regulation in April 2017. See Order Granting Motion to Hold 
Case in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (Apr. 28, 2017), ECF No. 1668274. After 
EPA published its notice of repeal in the Federal Register, the D.C. Circuit issued an order on its 
own motion extending the period of the abeyance for another sixty days. Order Continuing 
Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (Nov. 9, 2017), ECF No. 1703889. 
 182. See Ellen M. Gilmer, Sidelined Climate Rule Suffers Another Blow in the Courtroom, 
E&E NEWS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060058556/search?
keyword=clean+power+plan [https://perma.cc/5FT5-LGST] (discussing the Clean Power Plan’s 
“deep freeze”). 
 183. In other words, it considered emissions reductions that could not be accomplished by the 
equipment within the boundaries of the facilities themselves.  
 184. See LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN 
POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA 16–
30 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC6F-53GK] (overviewing 
the main litigation challenging the Clean Power Plan).  
 185. Id. at 7.  
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pollution control devices.186 Because the EPA considered factors 
outside of the “fence line” of the power plants when setting the 
performance standard, they contend that it overstepped its authority 
under Section 111(d).187  
The petitioners’ argument would still permit source-specific 
greenhouse gas emissions regulation under Section 111, but certain 
heavily polluting sources might be exempted due to the costs of 
compliance. Because Section 111 requires the EPA to consider cost 
when developing its performance standards, 188 there would likely be 
some sources that are so outdated and dirty that any “fence line” 
upgrades would be economically unfeasible.189 In the oral arguments 
for West Virginia, Judge Cornelia Pillard pressed this point, asking 
whether, under the fence line argument, certain sources could be 
“necessarily immunized from regulation under Section 111(d).”190 The 
petitioners’ counsel responded that “it’s [a] question of what tools 
Congress has given.”191 He continued: “[I]n the UARG case the 
Supreme Court found that notwithstanding the importance of climate 
change, notwithstanding the purpose of the Clean Air Act, some of 
those regulations were unlawful because they exceeded [the] EPA’s 
authority, and that’s all we’re saying here.”192 This suggests that, if the 
EPA cannot regulate beyond the fence line, there may be a small 
subset of heavily polluting existing sources that cannot be regulated 
under Section 111(d) because requiring efficiency upgrades would be 
too costly.  
The petitioners’ second argument—that sources regulated under 
Section 112 cannot be regulated under Section 111(d)—stems from the 
fact that conflicting versions of an amendment to Section 111(d) were 
both passed and codified into law in the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.193 Under the Senate version, Section 111(d) cannot be 
 
 186. Id. at 19–20.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Section 111 requires that costs be “tak[en] into account” when developing best system of 
emissions reduction regulations under this section. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(i).  
 189. Cf. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding 
that Section 111 does not require a full cost-benefit analysis but that regulations under that section 
must still be economically and technologically feasible). 
 190. Transcript of Oral Argument at 94–95, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 27, 2016). 
 191. Id. at 95.  
 192. Id. at 95–96.  
 193. TSANG & WYATT, supra note 184, at 21.  
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used to regulate any “air pollutants” regulated under Section 112.194 
The House version, on the other hand, prohibits Section 111(d) from 
regulating air pollutants “emitted from a source category which is 
regulated under” Section 112.195 The petitioners have argued that the 
House amendments should control. Because power plants are 
regulated under Section 112 for their emissions of mercury, this version 
of Section 111(d) would not allow the EPA to regulate those plants’ 
carbon dioxide emissions in any manner.196 Thus, the petitioner’s 
reading of Section 111(d) would create a loophole where existing 
sources like power plants could not be subject to performance 
standards for their emissions of carbon dioxide or any other 
pollutants.197  
The petitioners’ third claim is based on the Tenth Amendment, 
and contends that, in issuing the Clean Power Plan, the EPA 
impermissibly arrogated to itself traditional state control of the power 
grid and commandeered the states and their legislatures.198 Petitioners 
have argued that the cooperative federalist structure of the Clean Air 
Act, which enables the EPA to issue a federal implementation plan if 
states choose not to issue their own state implementation plan, does 
not cure the problem because it nevertheless “leaves States no choice 
but to alter their laws and programs governing electricity generation 
and delivery to accord with federal policy.”199 If this argument is 
correct, it would mean that Section 111(d) could not be used to regulate 
the power sector and might call into question the cooperative 
federalism components of the Clean Air Act in general.  
3. Section 112—Hazardous Air Pollutants.  Section 112 enables the 
EPA to set technological standards for new and existing stationary 
sources of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). To be considered a HAP, 
the pollutant must present “through inhalation or other routes of 
exposure, a threat of adverse human health effects . . . or adverse 
 
 194. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574.  
 195. Id. § 108(g), 104 Stat. at 2467 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A)(i) (2018)) (emphasis 
added).  
 196. Among their arguments, the petitioners point to a footnote in AEP which states that the 
“EPA may not employ [Section 111(d)] if existing stationary sources of the pollutant in question 
are regulated under . . . § [1]12.” TSANG & WYATT, supra note 184, at 22 (alterations in original) 
(quoting Opening Brief of Petitioner’s on Core Legal Issues at 61–74, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) 
(No. 10-174)).  
 197. TSANG & WYATT, supra note 184, at 23. 
 198. Id. at 23–24.  
 199. Id. at 23. 
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environmental effects.”200 The EPA must develop emission standards 
for major stationary sources emitting more than ten tons per year of 
any one HAP or twenty-five tons per year of any combination of 
HAPs.201 These standards must reflect the “maximum achievable 
control technology” achieved by the best performing 12 percent of 
existing sources of those HAPs.202 
Applying the UARG test, it seems unlikely that Section 112 could 
be construed to address greenhouse gases. Section 112 has historically 
been used only to regulate toxic substances that have direct effects on 
human health when emitted at relatively low quantities.203 Though the 
text also permits the regulation of air pollutants that affect the 
environment, it still seems to require that those pollutants affect the 
environment directly through some “route[] of exposure.”204 Because 
greenhouse gases primarily affect the environment indirectly through 
their contribution to global warming, they may not fit within the plain 
text of the section.205 Even more problematically, every stationary 
source that emits more than ten tons of greenhouse gases per year 
would be subject to maximum achievable control technology 
standards. This threshold is ten times less than triggering levels in the 
PSD and Title V provisions, and would subject thousands of small 
sources to burdensome regulatory requirements.206 Therefore, 
greenhouse gases probably cannot be regulated under Section 112.  
 
 200. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 201. Id. § 7412(a)(1).  
 202. Id. §§ 7412(d)(3), (g)(2). 
 203. E.g., EPA Announces Biggest Air Toxic Reduction in Agency History, EPA (Mar. 1, 
1994), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/epa-announces-biggest-air-toxic-reduction-agency-
history.html [https://perma.cc/C5UV-9CBV]. 
 204. Id. § 7412(b)(2).  
 205. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
44,354, 44,368 (July 30, 2008) (discussing the applicability of Section 112 to greenhouse gases and 
concluding it would be “inappropriate” to regulate them under Section 112). But see Mark Bond, 
Can and Should Greenhouse Gases Be Regulated as Hazardous Air Pollutants Under Clean Air 
Act Sect. 112?, SABINE CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. 4 (2016), https://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/bond_-_ghgs_regulated_as_haps.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BFP4-MS3L] (arguing that it is possible to regulate greenhouse gases under this section). 
 206. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2443–44 (2014) (“[W]e think it beyond reasonable debate 
that requiring permits for sources based solely on their emission of greenhouse gases at the 100– 
and 250–tons–per–year levels set forth in the statute would be ‘incompatible’ with ‘the substance 
of Congress’ regulatory scheme.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 156 (2000))). 
HENNESSEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2018  11:10 PM 
1106  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1073 
4. Section 115—International Air Pollution.  Section 115 authorizes 
the EPA to regulate domestic air pollution that endangers other 
countries.207 The regulations are implemented through state or federal 
implementation plans, and could apply to all sources of the pollutant, 
including new and existing mobile and stationary sources.208 Two 
conditions must be satisfied before the EPA can regulate under the 
section: first, the EPA must determine, after “receipt of reports . . . 
from any duly constituted international agency” that an “air pollutant 
or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare in a foreign country”; and second, the foreign country 
must give the United States “essentially the same rights with respect to 
the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as 
is given that country by [Section 115].”209 If these prerequisites are met, 
the EPA must require the polluting states to revise their state 
implementation plans with “respect to so much of the applicable 
implementation plan as is inadequate to prevent or eliminate the 
endangerment.”210 
Section 115 seems to pass step one of the UARG test, but it is 
unclear how it would fare at step two. Because states—or the EPA 
through a federal implementation plan—could flexibly determine how 
to accomplish the emissions reductions, small sources incapable of 
shouldering heavy regulatory burdens would not necessarily be subject 
to the unavoidable regulatory requirements that the UARG Court 
found “obviously untenable.”211 However, because a Section 115 
regulation could potentially apply to every economic sector in every 
state, its opponents would argue that construing the section to 
encompass greenhouse gases requires a “clear statement” from 
Congress, which—the argument would go—is not present in the text of 
the section.212 
5. Section 615—Stratospheric Ozone Protection.  Section 615 
requires the EPA to “promptly promulgate” regulations respecting the 
 
 207. 42 U.S.C. § 7415.  
 208. Id. § 7415(b).  
 209. Id. § 7415(a), (c).  
 210. Id. § 7415(b).  
 211. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439.  
 212. But see Michael Burger et al., Legal Pathways To Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 370–93 (2016) (arguing that 
Section 115 can and should be used to regulate greenhouse gases). 
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control of “any substance, practice, process, or activity” that the EPA 
believes endangers the public health or welfare by affecting the 
stratosphere, especially stratospheric ozone.213  
Whether greenhouse gases could be addressed under this section 
depends on two central questions: first, whether the gases’ effect on the 
stratosphere in fact causes danger to the public health or welfare;214 and 
second, whether the statute is read as speaking clearly to the issue of 
greenhouse gases. Although some greenhouse gases do deplete the 
ozone, many of these have been phased out and replaced with 
chemicals that have high global warming potential but no effect on the 
ozone.215 Thus, not all greenhouse gases would fall under the umbrella 
of Section 615.  
Moreover, it is far from clear whether the section speaks clearly to 
the issue of greenhouse gases at all. Title VI of the Clean Air Act is 
dedicated to protecting stratospheric ozone, but a regulation 
concerning greenhouse gases would be primarily devoted to preventing 
climate change.216 Therefore, it is unclear whether Section 615 
addresses greenhouse gases, but it seems less promising than Section 
115. 
C. These Potential Gaps in Greenhouse Gas Coverage Might Create 
Openings for Federal Common Law Nuisance Claims  
The above analysis indicates that Sections 108 and 109, 112, and 
615 probably do not encompass greenhouse gases and therefore would 
not themselves displace the federal common law. That leaves two 
sections—Sections 111(d) and 115—as potential candidates for 
regulating existing sources greenhouse gases, but there are strong 
arguments against their applicability.217 If these sections are found not 
 
 213. 42 U.S.C. § 7671n.  
 214. See REVESZ, supra note 164, at 550 (suggesting that “[s]tratospheric ozone may be 
affected by increases in concentration of GHGs”).  
 215. Reducing Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) Use and Emissions in the Federal Sector Through 
SNAP, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/snap/reducing-hydrofluorocarbon-hfc-use-and-emissions-
federal-sector [https://perma.cc/7EYY-LMFS]. 
 216. Cf. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 458–59 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that 
non-ozone-depleting substances cannot be regulated under Section 612, which has much broader 
language than Section 615).  
 217. One other candidate might be the new source review provisions for existing stationary 
sources located in nonattainment areas, which are required to comply with “reasonably available 
control technology” (RACT). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–7515. Because the nonattainment section of the 
Clean Air Act parallels the PSD provisions, compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–7515 (providing tiered 
pollution control requirements for nonattainment areas), with §§ 7471–7493 (providing tiered 
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to address existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, then these gaps 
in coverage could be filled by the federal common law.  
Regarding Section 111(d), each of the arguments advanced by the 
petitioners in the Clean Power Plan lawsuit—the fence line argument, 
the Section 112 challenge, and the anti-commandeering challenge—
would create different gaps for the federal common law to fill.218 First, 
if the petitioners’ fence line argument is right, then federal nuisance 
claims might be leveraged against the dirtiest sources of greenhouse 
gases. The inevitable counterargument—that Section 111(d)’s 
requirement of cost consideration evinces a legislative intent to exclude 
sources for which compliance would be too costly—is unavailing. The 
lack of a legislative remedy under Section 111(d) should not be 
construed as an explicit choice by Congress to exempt these sources 
from pollution controls altogether; indeed, these same sources may be 
subject to regulation for their emissions of other pollutants under other 
Clean Air Act sections that do not allow cost consideration. Rather, it 
means only that Section 111(d) does not provide a framework to 
address these sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. As AEP and its 
progeny demonstrate, to implicitly displace federal nuisance claims, 
the Clean Air Act must provide a “sufficient” framework to address a 
given source’s greenhouse gases. If these mechanisms are not available 
for extremely dirty power plants’ greenhouse gas emissions, then the 
federal common law cannot be said to be displaced.  
Second, if the Section 112 argument is valid, then potentially all 
sources regulated under Section 112 could be subject to federal 
nuisance claims. The counterargument here (in addition to an 
argument like the fence line objection) would be that the EPA still has 
the authority to regulate these sources’ greenhouse gas emissions—it 
would just need to undo the Section 112 regulations first. But the 
delegation of this choice is not itself sufficient to displace the federal 
common law—the statute must contain a “sufficient legislative 
 
pollution control mechanisms for attainment areas), UARG’s analysis would probably be the 
same, and existing sources subject to RACT because of their emissions of “criteria pollutants” 
would presumably also be potentially subject to RACT for their greenhouse gas emissions. 
Though RACT is a more lenient standard than BACT, it would still mean that a source’s 
greenhouse gas emissions can be regulated, and therefore federal nuisance claims would be 
displaced. But because RACT applies to only to a relatively small subset of sources, see Counties 
Designated “Nonattainment,” EPA (June 20, 2017), https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/
mapnpoll.html [https://perma.cc/BFC3-PB72] (identifying relatively few areas of nonattainment 
where RACT would apply), this Note does not address this provision further.  
 218. Assuming that no other section would provide for the regulation of those sources’ 
greenhouse gas emissions either.  
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solution.”219 As the EPA observed, the agency “would have to choose 
between regulating HAP or Section 111 air pollutants, leaving a ‘gap’ 
and allowing the ‘unregulated emission of pollutants not listed as 
‘hazardous’ . . . but nonetheless dangerous to public health or 
welfare.’”220 During oral arguments for the Clean Power Plan litigation, 
Judge Patricia Millet observed that the petitioners’ position was a “bait 
and switch,” and portentously asked whether accepting their argument 
would place the law “back in the land of having to just deal with all . . . 
greenhouse gases [with] common law nuisance actions.”221 Indeed, it 
does.  
Finally, if the petitioners’ commandeering argument is accepted, 
then nuisance claims would seem to be viable against power plants and 
other sources that are heavily regulated by state law. The likely 
objection here would be based on federalism and judicial restraint—
that if the EPA cannot commandeer the states then neither should the 
federal courts. This seems unlikely to succeed, as the courts have a long 
history of compelling compliance with federal law.222 But even if a 
federal court declined to issue an injunction forcing the power industry 
to reduce its emissions, a substantial damages award could be very 
effective in catalyzing regulatory change.223  
The Section 115 analysis is simpler: it is all or nothing. If Section 
115 is found to embrace greenhouse gases, then the Clean Air Act 
could be used to comprehensively regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
and the federal common law would be displaced. But if not, federal 
 
 219. Asian Carp Case, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, 
the statement in AEP that “the delegation [of regulatory authority from Congress to the agency] 
is what displaces federal law” must be read in the context—AEP merely meant that the EPA does 
not have to regulate before the common law may be said to be displaced. Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011)). Rather,  
Congress’s decision to assign a particular problem to an executive agency . . . may be 
evidence of displacement, but the ebb and flow of agency action neither diminishes nor 
increases the role of federal common law. The important displacement question is 
whether Congress has provided a sufficient legislative solution to the particular 
interstate nuisance . . . . 
Id.  
 220. TSANG & WYATT, supra note 184, at 22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Respondent EPA’s 
Initial Brief at 83–84, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2016)). 
 221. Transcript of Oral Argument at 172, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 
27, 2016). 
 222. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819) (“[T]he [C]onstitution 
and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme . . . they control the [C]onstitution and laws 
of the respective [s]tates, and cannot be controlled by them.”).  
 223. For further discussion of the possible benefits of substantial damage awards, see infra 
Part IV.  
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common law nuisance claims would be viable against those sources not 
addressed under other sections.  
In sum, if any of the arguments challenging Section 111(d) are 
correct, then federal nuisance claims would probably be available 
against certain existing sources of greenhouse gas emissions, unless 
Section 115 encompasses greenhouse gases. Section 115 is a fine 
candidate, but its coverage of greenhouse gases would be hotly 
contested. If neither Section 111(d) nor Section 115 fully encompass 
greenhouse gases, then there would be no standards, enforcement 
mechanisms, or remedies to address certain existing sources’ 
greenhouse gas emissions. In other words, the Clean Air Act would not 
represent the “sufficient legislative solution” required under AEP’s 
own analysis to address these sources’ emissions. This would mean that 
federal common law nuisance claims against those sources would not 
be displaced, creating an important opening for the doctrine to fill the 
Clean Air Act’s gaps in greenhouse gas coverage.  
IV.  USING THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO CATALYZE 
COMPREHENSIVE GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION  
As discussed in Part III, the Clean Air Act’s coverage of existing 
sources’ greenhouse gas emissions is far from certain. A federal 
nuisance suit in the face of this uncertainty could have two outcomes. 
On one hand, such a suit could compel a court to clarify that Section 
111(d) and/or Section 115 do indeed encompass greenhouse gases, 
thereby displacing the common law, which ultimately could force the 
EPA to regulate those gases under those sections. On the other hand, 
if the common law is found not to be displaced, industry actors facing 
enormous liabilities may be incentivized to lobby Congress for more 
comprehensive legislation that is preemptive. Ultimately, the objective 
of either outcome is the same: to catalyze comprehensive regulatory 
coverage of greenhouse gases in the United States. 
The Clean Air Act’s coverage of most existing sources’ 
greenhouse gas emissions primarily hinges on two sections: Section 
111(d) and Section 115. But, as discussed in Part III, whether and to 
what extent these two sections provide for the regulation of 
greenhouse gases from existing sources is an open question, 
particularly because the D.C. Circuit signaled it would no longer issue 
a decision on the merits of the Clean Power Plan—which was premised 
on Section 111(d). Given this uncertainty, a court hearing a federal 
nuisance suit against existing sources would need to determine whether 
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either section provides for the regulation of the defendant’s 
greenhouse gas emissions before it could dismiss the suit. 224 The 
resolution of this issue would be salutary, win or lose.  
On the one hand, a judicial finding that either Section 111(d) or 
Section 115 addresses existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions and 
thereby displaces the federal common law would mean that the EPA 
could regulate greenhouse gases under those sections. Either section 
could be used by the EPA to create effective market-based regulations 
that could substantially reduce greenhouse gases at much lower costs 
than traditional command-and-control approaches used in other 
sections of the Clean Air Act.225  
That judicial finding could also be used to force the EPA to 
develop greenhouse gas regulations under these sections. For instance, 
under Section 115, if the two threshold requirements are met—
international endangerment and reciprocity—then the statute provides 
that the EPA “shall” notify the states and require them to amend their 
state implementation plans as necessary to “prevent or eliminate the 
endangerment.”226 Since greenhouse gases emitted from the United 
States undisputedly contribute to climate change, which is dangerous 
to every country,227 and international agreements like the Paris 
Agreement seem to satisfy the reciprocity requirement,228 then both 
threshold requirements would seem to be met. This would create a 
nondiscretionary duty for the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases under 
 
 224. It would not be enough merely to say that other sections might address greenhouse gases. 
A statute cannot “speak directly” to the question without addressing the question to begin with. 
In every case in which courts have found the common law to be displaced, they have found that 
the statute affirmatively addressed the issue, not merely that it might have. If that were the case, 
it would have been unnecessary for AEP to discuss Massachusetts or Section 111(d) at all.  
 225. See, e.g., Burger et al., supra note 212, at 360–63 (discussing the mechanisms of a Section 
115 regulation and noting that the “EPA and the states could use the provision to establish an 
economy-wide, cross-sectoral GHG emissions trading program that incorporates both stationary 
and mobile sources”).  
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a)–(c) (2018).  
 227. Indeed, the EPA’s endangerment finding for greenhouse gases under Section 202 of the 
Clean Air Act was based in part on research from the International Panel on Climate Change, 
which showed that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions were contributing to climate change 
and endangering the planet. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,610–12 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
The IPCC appears to be a “duly constituted international agency” for the purposes of Section 
115. See Burger et al., supra note 212, at 373.  
 228. See Burger et al., supra note 212, at 375–92 (considering whether Section 115(c)’s 
reciprocity requirement is procedural or substantive and concluding that the United States’ 
treaties and nonbinding commitments satisfy either standard).  
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Section 115. Citizens or states could petition the EPA to regulate229 and 
then compel compliance using the citizen-suit provision of the Clean 
Air Act.230 
On the other hand, if a court hearing a federal nuisance case were 
to find that neither Section 111(d) nor Section 115 addresses a given 
source’s greenhouse gas emissions, then federal nuisance claims 
against that source would be viable. Litigants could seek either 
injunctive relief, forcing greenhouse gas emitters to reduce or eliminate 
their greenhouse gases, or damages for the harms caused to them by 
climate change. Because of the regulatory uncertainty and litigation 
risks the federal common law entails, federal nuisance suits can be 
extremely costly.231 For instance, in Kivalina, the plaintiffs, a small 
village and tribe, asked for compensation for the damages to the town 
caused by climate change-induced erosion, which the plaintiffs valued 
in the millions of dollars.232 If instead, the litigants were a group of 
coastal states or island nations asking for compensation for their lost 
 
 229. All citizens may petition agencies to undertake rulemaking under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2018). 
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. The Supreme Court has clarified that an agency’s denial of a petition 
to regulate—as opposed to its decision not to bring an enforcement action—is subject to judicial 
review. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007). Moreover, a finding that Section 115 
does address greenhouse gases might open the door for foreign countries or their citizens to bring 
federal nuisance claims against domestic polluters. On the other hand, it might be argued that the 
United States’ international climate agreements or simply the President’s interest in diplomacy 
would displace a foreign country’s nuisance claim. This presents interesting issues that are beyond 
the scope of this Note. For a discussion of international transboundary pollution cases, see 
generally TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006). 
 231. The cost and regulatory uncertainty of the federal common law have led many to criticize 
the doctrine, especially the judges who are fashioning it. Judges worry that they are ill-equipped 
to fashion remedies in complex areas like environmental pollution, and they are hesitant to step 
on the toes of the legislature or interfere with principles of federalism. See, e.g., Milwaukee II, 451 
U.S. 304, 312–14 (1981). But AEP itself reaffirmed that there has been a robust lineage of cases 
that have “approved federal common-law suits brought by one State to abate pollution emanating 
from another State.” 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011). It stressed that environmental protection is 
“undoubtedly an area . . . in which federal courts may fill in ‘statutory interstices,’ and, if 
necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’” Id. (quoting Friendly, supra note 36, at 421–22). Therefore, 
the mere fact that federal nuisance claims are costly and engender regulatory uncertainty does 
not mean that they cannot or should not be leveraged. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common 
Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 809 (1989) (finding that despite their distaste with the doctrine, 
judges do in fact make federal common law and arguing that they should do so “overtly, rather 
than through gratuitous rulings on the supposed infirmities of judicial federal lawmaking power”). 
 232. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012).  
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shorelines,233 the damages could run into the tens or hundreds of 
billions of dollars.234  
In addition to being forced to compensate states injured by climate 
change, industry actors might be persuaded by the extreme costs of 
federal nuisance litigation to prefer a federal statute that displaces the 
federal common law. Under this theory, the “imposition of variable, 
potentially inconsistent and more costly litigation outcomes induces 
industry to seek preemptive federal legislation to reign [sic] in such 
costs.”235 For instance, the wave of federal environmental laws in the 
late 1960s and 1970s has been attributed to industry’s efforts to 
preempt the patchwork of state regulations that made regulatory 
compliance much more expensive.236 In a more modern example, the 
chemical industry’s surprising support for the recent Toxic Substance 
Control Act amendments, which place significant burdens on the 
industry, has been attributed to the industry’s preference to “operate 
in a market that has regulatory certainty” by preempting state laws.237 
Indeed, AEP itself was praised by industry because it was seen as 
enhancing regulatory certainty. As one commentator put it: “At a time 
when regulated entities decry regulatory uncertainty, the Court has 
provided a clear progression for GHG regulation: expect agency action 
first and then, if States or environmental groups are unhappy with 
these standards, redress can be sought in the federal courts.”238  
This suggests that industry would likely prefer a federal statute 
addressing greenhouse gases to the litigation risk posed by the federal 
common law. 
 
 233. Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 (holding that Massachusetts’ loss of coastline was 
sufficient to confer standing).  
 234. See FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE 
COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2008), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/cost.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W8FC-7CQR] (projecting sea-rise related real estate loss to cost the United States $360 
billion per year annually by 2100 if global warming continues unchecked).  
 235. Colares & Ristovski, supra note 9, at 332.  
 236. Id.; see also E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory 
of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326–
29 (1985).  
 237. Christina Valimaki, New TSCA Regulation: Benefit and Burden for the Chemical 
Industry, ELSEVIER (July 7, 2016), https://chemical-materials.elsevier.com/chemical-rd/new-tsca-
regulation-benefit-and-burden-for-the-chemical-industry [https://perma.cc/4EQP-KGH9].  
 238. JENNIFER SMITH LENTO, SUPREME COURT RULES AGAINST FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
NUISANCE CLAIMS BECAUSE EPA, NOT THE JUDICIARY, IS AUTHORIZED TO REGULATE 
UTILITY EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES (2011), https://www.nixonpeabody.com/-
/media/Files/Alerts/Environmental_Alert_06_22_2011.ashx [https://perma.cc/HRL7-DU9A].  
HENNESSEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2018  11:10 PM 
1114  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1073 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, UARG demonstrates that the Clean Air Act does not 
comprehensively address greenhouse gases, and therefore the 
conclusion drawn from AEP—that federal nuisance claims concerning 
greenhouse gases are dead and buried—is premature. Instead, a 
federal nuisance claim against a given source can only be said to be 
displaced if the Clean Air Act is found to provide a sufficient 
framework to regulate that source’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
Applying UARG’s context-specific test to the potentially applicable 
sections of the Clean Air Act, it appears that only two sections of the 
Clean Air Act, Sections 111(d) and 115, might address existing 
stationary sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, but their coverage is 
uncertain, especially because the D.C. Circuit seems increasingly 
unlikely to rule on the Clean Power Plan.  
In light of this uncertainty, we should toss away the obituary and 
leverage federal nuisance suits against the same types of sources that 
were sued in AEP. On the one hand, a nuisance suit in this context 
could compel a court to clarify that either Section 111(d) or Section 115 
addresses greenhouse gases, which could in turn be used to force the 
EPA to develop effective and comprehensive regulations. On the other 
hand, if a court were to find that no section of the Clean Air Act 
addresses these sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, then the massive 
litigation risk caused by federal nuisance suits could induce those 
industries to ask Congress to pass legislation that comprehensively 
addresses climate change and displaces the federal common law in the 
process. Win or lose, reviving the federal common law of nuisance 
presents a compelling opportunity to force comprehensive, federal 
action to address the pressing issue of climate change.  
 
